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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents a detailed study of the fundamentals
of modern naval surface missile combat and, through the
vehicles of combat modeling, simulation, and quantitative
analysis, describes a method of evaluating tactics. It
establishes three basic laws of naval combat, tests the theory
that undergirds the laws against a data set, and provides a
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I. INTRODUCTION
There currently exist no naval combat models that
adequately describe modern naval warfare. This fact has
consequences that reach far beyond the academic use of such
models. In all areas of naval operations analysis, including
analysis in support of procurement, planning, logistics, and,
most important, tactical decisions made during conflict, there
is a compelling need for a coherent, useful analytical tool
that brings the fundamentals of this process to light. In the
absence of such a tool, analysis continues to be diffuse,
independent, and disconnected.
This thesis presents a detailed study of the fundamentals
of modern naval surface warfare, and through modeling,
simulation, and quantitative analysis, provides a useful
method of tactical analysis. By developing a theory of warfare
based on salvo exchanges, testing this theory against a robust
data set, and dissecting the constituent elements of the
process, this thesis seeks to establish a global framework for
further study and application.
Specifically, it is the aim of this thesis to describe the
characteristics of modern salvo warfare, the tactical
implications of these characteristics, the components of salvo
exchanges, and the variables associated with the application
of lethal force at sea. In addition, it seeks to summarize the
tactics of modern naval combat with a single model and with a
single measure of effectiveness.
Given that these goals are accomplished, the contents of
this thesis will aid in such decisions as determining future
weapons and platform characteristics, selection of operational
doctrine, and logistical planning requirements. Ultimately, it
will provide the means to determine which assets a fleet
commander must give his group commander to accomplish a
certain mission, what uncertainties the group commander may
experience in the application of these assets, and how to




The first step in discussing naval combat models is to
establish a framework of terminology. The following terms and
their definitions suggest a relationship to physical systems
that helps to describe "the dynamics of physical bodies that
warriors apply to the processes of combat" [Ref. 1].
1. Combat Energy
Combat Energy is a characteristic of a participant
that has some lethal value in combat, e.g., missiles engender
lethal energy and, therefore, combat energy within a guided
missile ship.
2. Combat Potential
Combat potential is stored combat energy. Combat
potential resides in the missiles stored in the launchers and
magazines of a guided-missile ship, for example.
3. Combat Power
Combat power is the expenditure rate of combat energy
by one participant against another during conflict. The number
of missiles a ship shoots at another in one salvo is a
delivered pulse of combat power.
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4. Effective Combat Power
Effective combat power is combat energy applied to a
participant as a result of physical interaction between
participants. The number of missiles (after accounting for the
effect of the defense) which actually hit a ship and cause
damage is a measure of effective combat power.
5. staying Power
Staying power is a measure of the amount of enemy
combat energy a ship can absorb before its own combat energy
is extinguished. The number of missile hits a ship can sustain
until it is of no remaining value in combat is a measure of
the staying power of that ship.
It is important to note the relationships between these
terms. Combat power erodes staying power, while staying power
determines the value of combat potential. Moreover, a ship
must have combat potential before it can expend combat power.
Staying power is often an evaluation made in relation to a
"mission kill", i.e., how much damage must be done to render
a ship useless for current combat purposes (not necessarily
the amount of high explosive required to actually sink it).
Therefore, combat potential and combat power can only be
evaluated with respect to the staying power of a specific
enemy target ship. This ship may usefully be defined as a
notional, or benchmark, ship (a device not used in this
thesis).
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B. SQUARE LAW THEORY
The "Lanchester" square law is important in any study of
naval combat models, but particularly useful here since it is
the point of departure for the theory presented in this
thesis.
1. Backgrvund
Naval combat models had their inception in 1902 when
J. V. Chase, a lieutenant at the Naval War College, devised
the classic square law model as a way to mathematically
express naval combat as force-on-force attrition
[Ref. 2]. Unfortunately, his work was classified until
1972, thus denying him the credit given to F. W. Lanchester
[Ref. 3] and M. Osipov [Ref. 4], who published their square
law land combat models independently in 1914 and 1915,
respectively.
2. Square Law Equations
Chase's basic square law equation gives the surviving
combat power of side M at time t after an inferior side N has
been annihilated:
(a M)2 b2a n)
(alm) = (am)o - b 2 (a2N b1a2
Where:
m: number of ships on side M
n: number of ships on side N
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a1: staying power of side M, per ship
a2: staying power of side N, per ship
bi: combat power of side M, per ship
b2: combat power of side N, per ship
The model shows the effect of combat power on enemy
staying power during a time interval (O,t]. In an era when
heavily armored hulls and gunnery were the determir-nts of
naval combat, their interaction was well described by Chase's
equations.
C. FISKE'S SALVO METHOD
Also of note in the early development of naval combat
models is Rear Admiral (then Commander) B. A. Fiske's
numerical description of the square law effect, which appeared
in his 1905 prize-winning essay "American Naval Policy".
Fiske, not privy to Chase's application of calculus, portrayed
naval combat as salvoes inflicted by the participants over
discrete periods of time. The square law phenomenon is still
evident even though he only employed elementary mathematics in
his computations. [Ref. 5]
D. SALVO WARFARE THEORY
Profound technological advances in weapons systems have
dated the description presented by Chase and Fiske of naval
combat as a gradual erosion of one force by the other. These
vast changes have resulted in systems that deliver great doses
6
of combat power over long ranges with nearly simultaneous
arrival at the target of the entire combat power of a
participant. In addition, prior to the advent of modern
missile exchanges, the only defense was a ship's staying
power. Current technology provides for an active defense
(e.g., anti-cruise missile missiles and guns) and a passive
defense (e.g., chaff and electronic countermeasures). Thus,
ships may have both offensive and defensive combat power as
well as staying power. In effect, the entire character of
naval combat has cnanged and the process is more aptly called
salvo warfare.
1. The First Law of Salvo Warfare
Near-instantaneous attrition has thus replaced
incremental attrition as the fundamental concept of naval
warfare. Time is no longer integral to the process and,
therefore, square law theory does not apply. The elimination
of time implies that new theories may be "event-stepped" (the
salvo being the event) instead of "time-stepped". This, then,
is the point of departure for a new theory of naval combat,
dictating the first law of salvo warfare:
Salvo exchanges are interactions of pulses of combat
power and therefore event-stepped phenomena rather than
continuous processes of attrition.
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2. The Taylor Model
There are currently only two salvo warfare models
resident in the literature. The first, by T. C. Taylor
[Ref. 6], describes force effectiveness as:
FAR= 1 - 1Eo x (1 - EDA)}
Where:
FAR: fraction of side A's combat effectiveness remaining
after the salvo
E08: fraction of side A's total tactical capability
destroyed by side B's salvo in the absence of defensive
measures
EDA: fraction of E0B annulled by A's defense
Although Taylor's equation addresses the fundamentals of
salvo warfare, it is computationally misleading because the
variables express effectiveness as fractions. Adding to this
conceptual confusion, tactical inputs are implied rather than
directly represented. Moreover, the effects of overkill and
scouting are not discussed. Appendix A contains sample
calculations that show the distortions of Taylor's model in
greater detail.
Further development by Taylor leads to a measure of
effectiveness which describes the outcome of a salvo exchange
as the difference of fractions of combat power remaining. This
result is difficult to reach, however, without a more tangible
method of computing combat effectiveness.
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3. The Hughes Model
A better approach is found in Chapter 10 of Hughes,
Fleet Tactics [Ref. 7]. The theory behind his model
is:
Losses to A - Effective Offensive Combat Power of B
Staying Power of A, Per Ship
Where:
Effective Offensive Combat Power of B =
Offensive Combat Power of B - Defensive Combat Power of A
The appealing features of Hughes' theory are that the
basic computations are contained in the model and that staying
power is directly represented. In addition, the inputs are
readily determined by tactical evaluation and the output is
easily applied to mission-specific goals. Based upon the
intuitively engaging approach, concise formulation, and
-actically meaningful framework, Hughes' theory is adopted as
the Second Law of Salvo Warfare:
Effective combat power is the attacker's pulse minus the
defender's actions, inflicting damage proportional to the
ratio of effective combat power to staying power.
The second law may be expressed mathematically as:
AA - { aBB - a1A)a2
Where:
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A: number of ships on side A
B: number of ships on side B
0: offensive combat power of side B, per ship
al: defensive combat power of side A, per ship
a2: staying power of side A, per ship
aB: scouting effectiveness of side B
Henceforth, this will be referred to as the second law
model. The inclusion of the dimensionless variable a,, the
scouting effectiveness of side B, will be discussed below.
Dimensional analysis of the model yields some useful
results. Defining "hits" as the units of measure for combat
power drives the following analysis.
Staying power, a2, is the number of hits sustained over a
defending ship's combat life and is therefore measured in
"hits/ship".
If combat potential is viewed as the total combat energy
that may be transformed into combat power to do work
(specifically, to erode the defender's staying power) then by
dividing the amount of combat energy employed (combat power)
by the amount of work to do (staying power) results in units
of hits per hits per ship, or "ships". Since the concept of
combat potential is highly useful in tactical planning, it is
thus convenient to value the combat energy stored in a ship's
missile magazine, for example, as the number of notional ships
they are capable of destroying.
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Damage is measured, according to the second law model, as:
hit s - hits hits ships,
hi ts hi ts
ship ship
which makes both computational and tactical common sense. In
addition, whether combat potential is viewed as the capacity
to erode staying power or as the ability to do damage, the
dimensions will still be units of notional ships. These
results constitute the third law of salvo warfare:
Combat power is measures in units of hits, staying power
in units of hits per ship, and combat potential and damage
in units of ships.
4. Salvo Attrition
Further evidence for rejecting square law models
follows from the fact that they consist of coupled
differential equations based on simultaneous attrition where
one side dominates the other to extinction. The full square
law effect only appears when the battle is fought to the
annihilation of one of the sides, producing results that are
of little use in modeling exchanges that inflict only partial
damage on an enemy.
Moreover, square law models do not address the various
cases of salvo attrition. Salvo warfare permits different
types of interaction during combat. Because of longer weapons
ranges and the attendant scouting problems, side A may shoot
at side B without side B returning fire, side B may shoot at
side A without A returning fire, or A and B may exchange fire.
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Also, one side may surprise the other with a salvo, which, in
turn responds with a salvo of its own (if it has any surviving
combat power). The second law model allows for modeling each
side independently in all of these exchange variations, i.e.,
each equation describing AA has a companion equation
describing AB. Measuring the process independently after each
event satisfies the need to describe exchanges where
annihilation and simultaneous attrition do not occur.
5. Scouting Effectiveness
In Chapters 4 and 10 of Fleet Tactics, Hughes shows
that the use of pulse power weapons makes scouting as crucial
as the weapons themselves, concluding that the fundamental
maxim of modern naval warfare is "fire effectively first".
[Ref. 8] In the second law model, a., a dimensionless force
degrader with range [0,1], illustrates the impact of firing an
effective salvo before an opponent can. A value of zero means
that side B has useless or no scouting information about side
A, either because it is surprised by A, or because A has used
countermeasures ("anti-scouting", in Fleet Tactics). A value
of one means that side B has perfectly scouted side A.
[Ref. 9] Thus, surprising or confusing an enemy nullifies his
ability to do damage, whereas having perfect scouting is the
deterministic starting point for evaluating the damage a ship
will do with its effective combat power.
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III. CONDUCT OF THE EXPERIMENT
Theories, once presented, must be tested against either
historical or experimental data. Since there remains a dearth
of historicdl data from modern (Post World War II) naval
combat, it was necessary to design an experiment which would
provide a data set to test the theory of salvo warfare
presented above. The best way short of war to generate such a
data set is through a high-resolution wargame simulation. Of
the numerous wargaming assets at the Naval Postgraduate School
the one that best serves this purpose is the Naval Tactical
Gaming System (NAVTAG). The following is a description of this
system, the design of the experiment, and a discussion of the
data that were collected.
A. THE NAVTAG SYSTEM
NAVTAG, used by the fleet since 1982, is primarily a
medium for training surface warfare officers to make tactical
decisions. The current version operates on a network of three
personal computers and has an extensive data base containing
air, surface, and subsurface platforms from the United States
and Soviet Union orders of battle, as well as those from many
other countries.
The most attractive aspect of NAVTAG is that it conducts
simulations at a very detailed level, allowing the operator to
13
order movement, process sensor information, and employ weapons
from an individual ship commander's tactical perspective. It
also retains all orders, contacts, weapons interactions, and
damage in memory for post-game analysis. This was crucial
during the analysis, since it permitted pairing causes and
effects.
B. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT
Simulation of salvo warfare necessarily involves many
variables and a significant amount of variation among trials.
It was therefore important to eliminate as many variables as
possible by developing simple scenarios that retained the
essence of salvo warfare yet produced analytically meaningful
results. It was also equally important to conduct many
iterations of the same scenario to reduce the effect of the
variation between trials for the final analysis. Prudent
selection of ships, scenarios, and rules of engagement (ROE's)
helped reduce the number of variables during the simulation.
1. Ship Selection
Many different ship classes were considered, but based
on the simplicity of the weapon systems and its familiarity to
the operator, the Knox-class frigate (FF-1052) was chosen. The
NAVTAG representation of this platform has four surface-to-
surface missiles (SSM's), a 20mm caliber gatling gun close-in
weapon system (Mk 91 CIWS), and a five-inch caliber anti-air
battery (5"/54 Mk 42). This platform was selected mainly
14
because it limited the size of each ship's salvo to four SSM's
(increasing computational efficiency during the analysis) and
dealt only with point defenses (avoiding the confusion in
evaluating the contributions of area defense systems).
The author had 39 months experience on this class of ship
(24 months in the operations department and 12 months as
Tactical Action Officer). Therefore, personal operator
familiarity decreased the possibility of test errors resulting
from operator inexperience.
2. Scenario Selection
The distance between sides was set at 50 nautical
miles to incorporate targeting beyond the horizon. The spacing
between ships on a side was set at 1000 yards and the ships
were placed in a column perpendicular to the incoming SSM's.
This helped reduce variability since a salvo could be aimed at
the center of a formation and have a higher probability of
hitting.
NAVTAG allows the operator to create a scenario, save it
in memory, then re-use it repeatedly or update it as required.
It was therefore determined that a logical experimental
sequence would start with the most simple scenario (one FF
surprising another), collect data until enough were obtained,
and then add ships incrementally (or change tactics) after
enough data were obtained, until a useful set of data was
collected.
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Of the six scenarios conducted, two were surprises and
four were exchanges. Table 1 is a summary of the scenarios and
the force compositions.
TABLE 1. SCENARIO SUMMARY
Scenario # of Units # of Units Comments
Ion Side A on Side B I
I 1 1 A surprises B
II 1 2 A surprises B
III 1 1 A and B exchange fire
IV 1 2 A and B exchange fire
V 1 3 A and B exchange fire
VI 2 3 A and B exchange fire
3. ROE Selection.
Perfect scouting information was given to the
surpriser in the surprise scenarios and to both sides in the
exchange scenarios. A surprised ship was given no scouting
information and was therefore unable to activate any active or
passive defenses. Although airborne reconnaissance provided
offensive targeting data, each ship had to use its own sensors
for point defense assignments.
Each firing ship launched its SSM's in the active mode at
a range and bearing dictated by the targeting data. All
missiles were fired at a single point and arrived at the
target simultaneously as a single pulse of power.
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Defensively, CIWS would automatically acquire and engage
a target which the NAVTAG system determined was within its
firing parameters. The 5"/54 was fired in air barrage mode
with a priority assignment described as follows:
a. The incoming missile closest in range and coming from the
bearing closest to the threat axis was assigned first.
b. If no range information was available, the incoming
missile coming from the bearing closest to the threat
axis had assignment priority.
c. If no information was available, no assignment was made.
In each exchange scenario, chaff was continuously deployed
as soon as an incoming missile was detected.
The operator was the same for every battle and in every
scenario, providing the closest possible concord among
decisions throughout the experiment while still allowing human
interface.
As can be seen, every effort was made to keep the amount
of noise in the experiment to a minimum while retaining a
conceptually meaningful exchange. The important point is that
although the Knox-class was represented in the experiment, the
results should not be viewed as the actual results of Knox-on-
Knox battles. The emphasis was to create scenarios that
simulated naval combat generically, i.e., involved mobile
platforms, significant pulses of power over long ranges,
active and passive defenses, and units with staying power. For
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the purposes of the analysis, NAVTAG produced "real" naval
combat in the absence of actual historical battle data.
C. DISCUSSION OF DATA SET
A total of 275 battles were fought in NAVTAG and 1900
missiles were exchanged between 700 ships. Appendix B, a
sample data sheet, shows the type of information recorded
immediately following each battle during the post-game
analysis. Appendix C is a compilation of the raw data.
An important result determined during data collection was
that invariably exactly two missile hits would destroy an FF.
The staying power of the chosen platform, a2 in the second law
model, was therefore set at 2 hits/ship in the analysis
(although not used in computations, the combat potential of
each ship's 4 missiles was therefore evaluated as 2 ships).
Table 2 presents a summary of the data.
Numerous iterations of each scenario were run so that the
inputs for the model are averages across each scenario. Since
NAVTAG computes the percent of damage to each ship, it was
necessary to transform the damage figures into units of ships.
This was done by simply multiplying the average percent damage
to each side by the number of ships on that side. The result
is the average number of ships lost for each side for each
scenario.
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF DATA
Scenario Side # of Avg. # of Avg # of Avg # of
Ships offensive defensive Shipshits hits lost
I A 1 2.54 0.00 0.00
I B 1 0.00 0.00 0.94
II A 1 2.36 0.00 0.00
II B 2 0.00 0.00 1.24
III A 1 1.32 1.46 0.67
III B 1 1.32 1.46 0.67
IV A 1 0.96 1.40 1.00
IV B 2 4.08 2.42 0.54
V A 1 0.48 1.56 0.96
V B 3 5.16 3.32 0.30
VI A 2 1.64 2.96 1.61
VI B 3 4.48 4.04 0.97
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IV. CALCULATIONS
Chapter II is a compilation of possible starting points
for calculations rather than a mere review of the literature.
Although all of the models were in hand prior to the numerical
analysis, the seemingly straightforward task of applying the
data to them was hindered by the lack of an established
theoretical framework. From which points to start was decided
only after returning to first principles and defining the
terms rigorously. Square law models could then be rejected on
theoretical grounds and Taylor's model could be rejected on
computational grounds. Only Hughes' model advanced past the
second chapter to the detailed numerical analysis which
follows.
A. SECOND LAW MODEL
The key theoretical assumption of the second law model is
that the combat power of a side will increase linearly with
the number of units on a side, thus PB (or, equally, aA) will
describe the theoretical combat power of a side. Given that
the ships in the experiment have a staying power of 2
hits/ship, the damage predicted from the model should equal
the observed damage from NAVTAG.
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1. Calculations
Applying the data to the second law model involved
converting offensive and defensive hits to "probabilities of
kill", Pk-
The offensive Pk was calculated by dividing the number of
hits during the surprise scenarios by the total number of
missiles shot during these scenarios. This assumed a binomial
distribution, which gives the probability of y successes
(defined, in this case, as a hit) out of a possible total of
n in a trial where the fixed probability of an individual
success is p. The observed proportion of hits, y/n, is an
A
estimate, p, of the probability p.[Ref. 20] A review of the
data sheets showed that out of 400 missiles, 244 were hits, so
APk = 0.61. This value was multiplied by 4 to determine the
combat power during the salvo for each ship (2.44 hits).
The defensive Pk was calculated by dividing the number of
missiles shot down during the exchange scenarios by the total
number of missiles shot in these scenarios. Here, n = 1500,
A
y =526, so P = 0.351. This value was multiplied by 4 (the
number of incoming targets per salvo) to get the defensive
combat power for each ship (1.40 hits). Figure 1 shows the
resulting calculations. Note that the defensive combat power
of a surprised ship is 0 (by definition, the defenses are not
alerted) and tiL defensive combat power of a surprising ship
is 0 (no defense is required). Also note that losses in excess
of the number of ships present are rounded to the number of
21
AA _ -BOB - a 1A} and AB = OAaA - b1 B
a2  b2
• 3- 2.44 hits a, - b, - 1.40 hits
hi ts
a2 = b2 = 2 hiship
Scenario I A=1, B=1, aA-l, OB-O
AA = 0
AB = _{2.44-0} = -1.22 = -i
2
Scenario II: A=1, B=2, OA=I, OB=O
AA = 0
AB = _(2-44-01) 
- -1.22
2
Scenario III* A=I, B=I, aA=GB=l
AA - _(2.44-1.40} 
_ -0.522
AB = _(2.44-1.40} = -0.522
Scenario TV* A-i, B-2, OA-OB-I
AA = _{ 4.88-1.40} = -1.74 = -12
AB = _(2.44-2.80) 
- +0.18 = 02
Figure 1. Second Law Calculations
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Scenario A=1, B=3, aA=GB=l
AA = -{7.32-1.40} = -2.96 = -12
AB = _{2.44-4.20) = +0.88 = 02
Scenario VI: A=2, B=3, aA=GB=l
AA = -{7.32-2.801 = -2.26 = -22
AB - _{4.88-4.20} = -0.34
2
Figure I (Continued). Second Law Calculations
TABLE 3. COMPARISON OF PREDICTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
(SECOND LAW MODEL)
Scenario A AA 4A B AB AB
(Model) (NAVTAG) (Model) I(NAVTAG)
I 1 0.00 0.00 1 -1.00 -0.94
II 1 0.00 0.00 2 -1.22 -1.24
III 1 -0.52 -0.67 1 -0.52 -0.67
IV 1 -1.00 -1.00 2 0.00 -0.54
V 1 -1.00 -0.96 3 0.00 -0.30
VI 2 -2.00 -1.61 3 -0.34 -0.97
ships present and that positive loss values are rounded to
zero to preclude a side from gaining ships during an exchange.
2. Discussion
Table 3 shows the comparison between second law model
predictions and the experimental observations. Table 4 shows
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TABLE 4. % DIFFERENCE IN PREDICTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
(SECOND LAW MODEL)







the percent difference in lost ships between the predictions
and the experimental observations.
There are definite patterns in these tables which led to
some specific conclusions. First, the second law model
accurately predicted the outcome of the surprise scenarios
(Scenarios I and II). Second, the second law model accurately
predicted the outcome of scenarios where an abundance of
effective combat power, or "overkill", was a factor (Scenario
IV, side A and Scenario V, side A). Third, the second law
model inaccurately predicted the outcome of scenarios where
both defenses were involved and overkill was not a factor
(Scenario III, Scenario IV, side B, Scenario V, side B, and
Scenario VI).
These conclusions suggest that the offensive combat power
estimates were reasonable, but that the defensive combat power
estimates were not. (Note that the offensive combat power
estimates were derived from Scenarios I and II). Furthermore,
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linear aggregation of the combat power of the sides was a
faulty assumption, since neither of the estimates produced
accurate predictions as the number of ships on a side
increased. It became evident that the second law model, useful
as a theoretical tool, needed modification to be useful as a
working model. It was not that the basic theoretical law
failed, but that the mathematics of the equation were
inaccurate in practice. New estimates of combat power, more
sensitive to the Scenarios III through VI, were required.
B. THE FOUR-ELEMENT MODEL
Using the data in Table 2, a new method of aggregation was
devised. Since it was not accurate to assume that the Pk'S
were the same for all scenarios, estimating the combat power
values on a case-by-case basis logically appeared more
accurate. The assumption is that combat power does not
increase linearly with the number of ships on a side, but is
unique to each side in each scenario. The only useful observed
data available were effective offensive combat power and
defensive combat power values. Offensive combat power,however,
could be derived by adding defensive combat power to effective
offensive combat power. The resulting model is:
AA P- - Al)a2
Where a. and a2 are as before, but:
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P ': estimated offensive combat power of B
Al: observed defensive combat power of A
This model will hereafter be referred to as the four-
element model. Clearly, the observed defensive combat power of
A has been added to the observed effective offensive power of
B with the intention of subtracting it again in the model.
This additional step was chosen to adhere to the theoretical
concepts and to test for the reliability of the model's
predictive as well as descriptive abilities. Although it
prompts the additional assumption that every incoming missile
the defense shot at was going to hit, P' is still a more
accurate estimate since it is unique to each scenario and
directly derived from observed values. Obviously, Al is a
better aggregate value than a1A, since it is the observed
value for each scenario.
1. Calculations
Table 6 lists the values of a', /', A,, and B1, and
Figure 2 shows the four-element model calculations. Note that
the offensive and defensive combat power values seem to be, in
general, tied more to the target environment than the linear
estimates, i.e., more targets produce more missile hits and
fewer targets produce fewer missile hits.
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TABLE 5. FOUR-ELEMENT MODEL VALUES
Scenario IA ' A __ B ' B I _
I 1 2.54 0.00 1 0.00 0.00
II 1 2.36 0.00 2 0.00 0.00
III 1 2.78 1.46 1 2.78 1.46
IV 1 3.38 1.40 2 5.48 2.42
V 1 3.80 1.56 3 6.72 3.32
VI 2 5.68 2.96 3 7.44 4.04
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AA = B5 - A, and AB = - Aa " - BI1
a2  b2
HI ts
a2 = b2 = 2 = hip
Scenario I: 3 A=1, O B= 0
AA = 0
AB = _{ 2.54-0} = -1.27 - -1
2
Scenario II: OA=, oB=0
AA - 0
AB = _(2.36-0} _ -1.18
2
Scenario III: OAOGBl
AA = _{2.78-1.46} = -0.66
2
AB = _{2.78-1.46} = -0.66
2
Scenario IV* a A= G B = I
AA - _{ 5.48-1.40} _ -2.04 - -1
2
AB = _{3.38-2.42) = -0.48
2
Scenario V aO -1-
AA - -{6.72-1.56} = -2.58 = -1
2
AB- (3.80-3.32) . -0.24
2
Figure 2. Four-Element Model Calculations
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Scenario VI: aA= O=l
AA = -{7.44-2.96} = -2.24 = -22
AB - _{5.68-4.04} _ -0.822
Figure 2 (Continued). Four-Element Model Calculations
2. Discussion
Table 6 shows the comparison of the four-element model
predictions and the experimental observations. Table 7 shows
the percent difference in lost ships between the predictions
and the observations. Compared to the second law model, the
four-element model was remarkably more accurate across all
scenarios, with the exception of Scenario VI, side A. A number
of conclusions were drawn from a review of these tables.
First, the four-element model accurately predicted outcomes in
all but one case. Second, Scenario VI, side A, was an anomaly,
but warranted further investigation.
The results from side A in scenario VI suggest that side
B is losing almost 20 percent of its combat potential. After
accounting for the defense by the same means that provided
convergence in every other case, in this one instance the
model still did not predict how a significant portion of a
side's combat energy would be transformed into damage. In
pursuit of this lost potential the concept of combat entropy,
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a useful new method of quantifying tactics, was developed. The
discussion of combat entropy requires its own chapter, which
follows.
TABLE 6. COMPARISON OF PREDICTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
(FOUR-ELEMENT MODEL)
Scenario A AA AA B AB AB
_(Model) (NAVTAG) (Model) (NAVTAG)
I 1 0.00 0.00 1 -1.00 -0.94
II 1 0.00 0.00 2 -1.18 -1.24
III 1 -0.66 -0.67 1 -0.66 -0.67
IV 1 -1.00 -1.00 2 -0.48 -0.54
V 1 -1.00 -0.96 3 -0.24 -0.30
VI 2 -2.00 -1.61 3 -0.82 -0.97
TABLE 7. % DIFFERENCES IN PREDICTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
(FOUR-ELEMENT MODEL)









Combat entropy, a new term coined to describe the
difference between theoretical predictions and observed
results, is defined as a measure of the loss in combat power
by the attacker in a salvo exchange. It is the lost combat
power as a fraction of the maximum combat power attainable.
The term is borrowed from thermodynamics, where it is used to
quantify energy unavailable for work [Ref. 11]. The analogy is
incomplete, however. Combat is two-sided with inefficient, or
"wasted", offensive and defensive combat power both possible.
Negative losses, i.e., gains, are therefore possible with
combat entropy, but not in thermodynamics, where work always
entails wasted energy and positive entropy.
Although combat entropy is related to Clausewitz' notion
of friction [Ref. 12], friction subsumes combat entropy, since
friction takes other forms in addition to that associated with
salvo exchanges. Combat entropy is the result of many factors,
all of which are best identified by examining the set of salvo
exchange possibilities.
A. THE SALVO EXCHANGE SET
The salvo exchange set, S, is the set of all engagement
combinations possible during an exchange. By definition,
S s[P n D] u [P n D] u [P n D] u [P n D],
31
where:
P: effective offensive shots
D: effective defensive shots
P: ineffective offensive shots
D: ineffective defensive shots
Each subset of the salvo exchange set contains tactical
factors which contribute to combat entropy.
1. P n D
This subset contains all of the effective offensive
shots which are shot down by the defense. Combat power is
gained by the offense when the defense must expend more than
one defensive shot to destroy each incoming missile. The case
when two (or more) defenders engage the same incoming missile
is called defensive "double-teaming" ("triple-teaming", etc).
2. P n B
This subset contains all the effective shots which
hit. Combat power is gained by the offense when the defense
misses incoming missiles or double-teams incoming missiles and
misses. Combat power is gained in this subset when the
offense, firing into a target-rich environment, has a higher
probability of hitting targets and thus, more hits.
3. P n D
This subset contains all the badly aimed and
ineffective offensive shots that are needlessly shot down by
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the defense. Combat power is gained by the offense when the
defense shoots down or double-teams missiles that would have
missed. Defensive combat power is lost in a target-poor
defensive environment, since the defense, not stressed to the
saturation threshold, does not realize its full potential.
This situation is defined as "defensive overkill".
4. PAD
This subset contains all the badly aimed and
ineffective offensive shots which the defender does not shoot
down. Combat power is lost because of offensive overkill, the
"missile-sump" effect, and when the offense shoots into a
target-poor environment.
Offensive overkill, the application of more combat power
to a target than is required, wastes shots.
The missile-sump effect occurs when a target absorbs more
than its share of hits when other targets are in the
environment. For example, 4 hits can be inflicted on 2 ships,
each with a staying power of 2 hits/ship, in many different
ways. The resulting damage ranges from 1 ship destroyed (all
4 hit the same ship and the sump effect is maximized) to 2
ships destroyed (2 hits on each ship and the sump effect does
not occur). When the missile-sump effect occurs, a hit is a
"wasted" shot and thus lost combat power.
Combat power is also lost when the offense fires into a
target-poor environment. Each missile's probability of
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acquiring a target decreases, resulting in fewer hits than
expected.
5. Types of Combat Entropy
As shown above, there are many causes of combat
entropy. For analytical purposes, two distinct types can be
defined. First, combat entropy may be caused by factors
affecting the quantity of hits inflicted. This is defined as
"engagement-induced" combat entropy. Second, combat entropy
may be caused by factors affecting the quality of the hits
inflicted. This is defined as "scenario-induced" combat
entropy. The following two sections will dissect the data set
and quantitatively describe the contributions of each type to
the total fractional loss in combat power.
B. ENGAGEMENT-INDUCED COMBAT ENTROPY
Salvo warfare is such a highly interactive process that
there are often an enormous number of different engagement
combinations in each exchange. This huge source of variability
is one reason that the second law model does not hold in
practice. Taking the observed values with the four-element
model in effect gives a much more accurate accounting of
factors which influence the quantity of hits inflicted. These
factors are:
a. the defense double-teams
b. the defense misses shots that hit
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c. the defense double-teams, then misses, shots that hit
d. the defense hits shots that would have missed
e. the defense double-teams, then misses, shots that would
have missed
f. defensive overkill
g. a target-poor environment for the offense
h. a target-rich environment for the offense
1. Calculations
The best way to measure these gains and losses is to
gauge all calculations relative to the simplest case. For
offensive combat power, the one-on-one surprise value from
Scenario I will be used. This scenario will be considered an
"offensive firing range" case, thus the theoretical combat
power for each ship in all calculations will be based on a
departure from the baseline of 2.54 hits. For defensive combat
power, the one-on-one exchange value from Scenario III will be
used. This scenario will be considered a "defensive firing
range" case, thus the theoretical combat power for each ship
in all calculations Aill be based on a linear extrapolation
from 1.46 hits. The resulting fractional loss of combat power
is computed by first calculating the lost hits from the
formula:
Lost Hits = AH - aA - b1B - a' o + Bi
where:
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predicted offensive combat power of A
b1B: predicted defensive combat power of B
bIB: orved e fensive combat power of AB 0: observed effective offensive combat power of A
Bi: observed defensive combat power of B
Lost hits are then converted to a fraction of lost
combat power by
Fraction of Lost Combat Power = 1 H_- AH}
Where:
HT: theoretical combat power of side A
Tables 8 and 9 list the lost hits, total theoretical
combat power, fraction of lost combat power, and, for
comparison, damage inflicted for sides A and B, respectively.
These values reflect the influence of tactical efficiency on
the quantity of hits inflicted.
2. Discussion
The most striking figures are those from Scenarios I
and II. The surprisers realize an almost 60 and 110 percent
increase in effectiveness, respectively. This is the result of
not having to waste combat power overcoming the defense.
Another important result from these tables is evident when
comparing the exchange scenarios. In Table 8, with one
offender the loss of combat power decreases as defenders
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increase from one to three. This implies that the influence of
an increasingly stronger defense and richer target environment
TABLE S. ENGAGEMENT-INDUCED COMBAT ENTROPY FOR SIDE A
Scenario AH R T  Fraction &B
I I of H. lost I
I -1.46 2.54 -0.57 -0.94
II -2.74 2.54 -1.08 -1.24
III 1.22 2.54 0.48 -0.67
IV 1.08 2.54 0.43 -0.54
V 1.00 2.54 0.39 -0.30
VI 3.10 5.08 0.61 -0.97
makes the scenario increasingly more deterministic.
Contrasting these values with the damage inflicted shows that
although less combat power is wasted, less damage is done,
since the dominating effect is the stronger defense.
As the attackers increase in number from one to two,
entropy almost doubles, punctuating the increase in
variability by adding just one ship to the offense. Damage,
however, almost triples, showing the net effect of doubling
the salvo size for the same size defense.
In Table 9, the surprised ships obviously lose combat
power since they do not fire. In the exchange scenarios, an
interesting result can be inferred from comparing Scenarios
III and IV. If the salvo size is doubled for the same size
defense, this time in a target poor environment, combat
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entropy decreases by a factor of 2.5, but damage only
increases by 33 percent. This shows that not all entropy is
TABLE 9. ENGAGEMENT-INDUCED COMBAT ENTROPY FOR SIDE B
Scenario AH HT  Fraction AA
I-_ _ _of H T lost I
I 1.08 2.54 0.43 -0.00
II 3.62 5.08 0.71 -0.00
III 1.22 2.54 0.48 -0.67
IV 0.94 5.08 0.19 -1.00
V 2.56 7.62 0.36 -0.96
VI 3.18 7.62 0.42 -1.61
the result of the quantity of hits, but their quality. As with
Scenario V, where entropy and damage only slightly increase
but the salvo size is 50 percent larger, this is caused by
overkill.
In Scenario VI, where the defense has one more ship than
Scenario V but not much more combat power is wasted by the
offense, a richer target environment and less overkill results
in more hits. The damage, however, is almost 20 percent less
than the theoretical damage, showing the profound influence of
the missile-sump effect.
C. SCENARIO-INDUCED COMBAT ENTROPY
Analyses of Tables 8 and 9 show how tactical efficiencies
affect the number of hits an offense can expect. They do not
show how the quality of these hits is affected by overkill and
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the missile-sump effect. The following analysis will develop
a method of quantifying these significant causes of combat
entropy.
1. Overkill
Overkill is a subjective concept. It is never clear
how much overkill is wasted combat power and how much is
increasing the certainty of destroying the defender. It
therefore remains the province of an individual commander to
decide how much force is required to ensure the success of the
mission. Although the need for increased certainty is apparent
to a current mission, the need to set aside a reserve for
future action is often compromised as a result.
The theoretical calculations of Figure 1, pages 22-23,
show that overkill was evident in Scenarios I, IV, V, and VI.
Table 10 lists the amount of overkill in each scenario in
numbers of hits and the resulting fraction of combat power
lost as a result.
The overkill in Scenario I seems to be a comfortable
margin, since the probability of all four missiles hitting is
only 0.6354 = 0.165.
Comparing the overkill with the damage inflicted shows
that there is not much difference in damage between Scenarios
IV and V, although the amount of entropy increases. The
significance of this is that if Side A in Scenario V fired a
salvo only two-thirds the size, it would only overkill by 0.74
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hits instead of 1.96, decreasing combat entropy from 0.257 to
0.097. The tactical implications are greater than just the
savings in lost combat power. The 4 SSM's held in reserve
account for 33 percent of the total theoretical combat
potential. That side would be able to engage one subsequent
defender and still inflict damage of 0.67 ships (67 percent of
the total) while sustaining damage of only 0.30 ships (10
percent of the total).
TABLE 10. OVERKILL BY SCENARIO
Scenario Overkill (Hits) Fraction Damage
I I of hT lost Inflicted
I 0.22 0.087 -0.94
IV 0.74 0.146 -1.00
V 1.96 0.257 0.96
VI 0.26 0.034 2.27
Scenario VI, however, shows that planning for overkill is
not sufficient. Even with an excess of 0.26 hits, the
resulting damage is still almost 20 percent lower than
predicted. The missile-sump effect is still the dominating
cause of combat entropy in this scenario.
2. Missile-sump Effect
In Scenario VI the predictions and observations differ
by 19.5 percent. After accounting for all other sources of
waste, this difference remains. It is clear that the only
remaining source of combat entropy is the missile-sump effect.
40
This 19.5 percent difference in damage equates to 0.39
ships' worth of damage out of a total of 2 and a waste in hits
of 0.78. More than three-quarters of an SSM were lost during
the exchange for no other reason than there were 2 targets and
12 missiles. These 0.78 hits correspond to an additional
fractional loss of combat power of 0.10.
Given that the two sides were 50 nautical miles apart and
the ship spacing was only 1000 yards, this is a strong
argument for massing to augment defenses. Massing is
tactically sound not only for the ability to increase the
attacker's combat entropy but also to strengthen the defense.
In addition, the missile-sump effect emphasizes the
variability in outcomes, since Side A, expecting overkill by
0.26 missiles, actually, has its effective hits reduced by
0.78, a total of more than 1 SSM.
Thus, both overkill and the missile-sump effect have a
significant influence on salvo exchanges, making them an
important consideration in tactical planning.
41
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The lack of conformity among analysts concerning modern
naval combat models compounded the initial difficulty
experienced while analyzing the data set. Inasmuch as the
analytical pursuit prompted a deeper theoretical effort, the
conclusions will remain directed more at promoting the
constituent elements of modern salvo warfare than presenting
the results of the experiment as universal. Accepting the
following postulates as maxims in salvo warfare theory will
finally allow naval professionals and military operations
analysts to put rudders over and steer a common course.
First, salvo exchanges are event-stepped phenomena rather
than time-stepped processes of attrition. This is offered
above as the First Law of Salvo Warfare.
Second, theoretical concepts must be unified as follows:
damage to a defender results from the effective combat power
of the attacker and is computed by calculating the ratio of
effective combat power to staying power. This is stated above
as the Second Law of Salvo Warfare. Modelers must adopt the
second law model as clearly portraying this relationship while
illustrating the importance of scouting effectiveness in
translating combat energy into ship damage. In addition, the
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Four-Element model is a practical application of this theory
with significant utility for the refined computations is and
essential to tactical planning and simulation analysis.
Third, adherence to a unified dimensional analysis of the
problem is crucial. Logically, combat power must be in units
of hits, staying power must be in units of hits per ship, and
combat potential and damage must be in units of ships. This is
stated above as the Third Law of Salvo Warfare. Plainly and
simply, this avoids confusion and keeps the discussion in
clear, tactically meaningful parlance.
Finally, the study of both the forms and causes of combat
entropy is the most instructive way to divine the sources of
wasted combat energy and is thus the key to developing
effective tactics. Especially in a salvo exchange where the
forces are close to parity, a clearer understanding of not
only what could go wrong but also what could go right may mean
the difference between victory and defeat.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although historical research is a highly valuable method
of estimating staying power estimates, computer simulation
with many iterations is the only way short of extensive firing
range tests to estimate the model's remaining parameters. In
addition, computer simulation is replaceable only by war in
determining the value of entropic parameters and fueling the
attendant tactical discourse (including the presentation of
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addition evidence in support of the above conclusions).
Henceforth, wargaming must be a major focus of the further
research of this topic. Although the resources exist at the
academic level, the fleet remains ignorant of this alternative
use of a system as readily available as NAVTAG. Gaming for
research and tactical experimentation should be encouraged at
the group, squadron, and ship level in pursuit of a greater
understanding of salvo warfare phenomena.
C. FUTURE RESEARCH
As the scope of the research began to narrow, it became
evident that there were major areas for future work left
untouched by this analysis. The following topics are among
those encountered but (unfortunately) bypassed in the effort
to codify the basic tenets of salvo warfare:
a. the use of another class of ship in an isometric exchange
scenario.
b. the introduction of heterogenous forces and a refined
aggregation methodology.
c. the effect of different ship formations and spacing on
the missile-sump effect.
d. an investigation of the relative effects of area AAW vs.
point defense on defensive combat power.
e. a determination of nominal values for force scouting
effectiveness.
f. a collection of more accurate firing range values.
g. an investigation into event-stepping the exchange to
annihilation.
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h. an investigation into range-stepping the exchange to
account for the effect of dissimilar weapons ranges on
tactics and damage predictions.
i. a collection of more accurate values for combat entropy
and a sensitivity analysis of the effect of entropic
parameters on battle outcome ,e.g., studying the effect
of the ratio of ship intervals to force separation on the
magnitude of the sump effect.
j. the development of a tactical tutorial for the fleet that
will bring everyone up to speed and into the debate.
As an epilogue, considering that a seemingly benign data
set evoked some unexpected seminal insights into not so much
unexplored but uncharted seas, it is hoped that ensuing
discussion and research within the framework presented above
may have even greater results. Agreeing on the framework,
however, is the imperative first principle.
45
APPENDIX A
TAYLOR MODEL SAMPLE CALCULATIONS
A. VARIABLE DEFINITION
According to the Taylor salvo model (see discussion, page
8), let:
EOA: the raw offensive effectiveness of side A, i.e., the
fraction of side B's total tactical capabilities
which would be destroyed by side A's salvo in the
absence of defensive actions by side B.
EDO: the fraction of EO which is nullified by a
successful, active defense.
Fs81: the fraction of side B's capabilities surviving.
Since additional variables will be needed for the
calculations, let:
a: Number of missiles launched in each salvo by side A
bl: Number of missiles side B's defense can shoot down
in each salvo
b2: Number of missiles side B can absorb before its
total tactical capability is destroyed
B. CALCULATIONS
1. Taylor Equation
Fse = 1 - (E A x (1 - EDO))
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2. Case I:
a = 2, b, = 1, b2 = 2
E = 1.00
ED8 = 1/2 of the effect of 2 missiles nullified =
(1/2) x 1.00 = 0.50
Fs8 = 1 - (1.00 x (1 - 0.50)) = 0.50
The model produces the expected result: 1 missile
penetrates the defense and causes 50% damage. The fraction
remaining is 0.50.
3. Case II:
a = 3, b I = 1, b2 = 2
Ec = 1.00
EDS = 1/3 of the effect of 3 missiles nullified =
(1/3) x 1.00 = 0.333
Fs8 = 1 - (1.00 x (1 - 0.333)) = 0.333
The model does not produce the expected results: 2
missiles penetrate the defense and cause 100% damage. The
fraction remaining should be 0.00, not 0.333.
4. Case III:
a = 4, bI = 2, h2 = 3
EC = 1.00
ED, = 2/4 of the effect of 4 missiles nullified =
(2/4) x 1.00 = 0.50
Fs3 = 1 - (1.00 x (I - 0.50)) = 0.50
47
The model does not produce the expected results: 2
missiles penetrate the defense and cause 100% damage. The
fraction remaining should be 0.00, not 0.50.
5. Case IV:
a = 8, b i = 4, b2 = 2
E = 1.00
E D = 4/8 of the effect of 8 missiles nullified =
(4/8) x 1.00 = 0.50
FsB = 1 - (1.00 x (1 - 0.50)) = 0.50
The model does not produce the expected results: 4
missiles penetrate the defense and cause 100% damage. The
fraction remaining should be 0.00, not 0.50.
6. Case V:
S= 2, b, = 1, b 2 = 3
E0, = 0.667
EDR = 1/2 of the effect of 2 missiles nullified =
(1/2) x 0.667 = 0.333
Fs8 = 1 - (0.667 x (1 - 0.333)) = 0.556
The model does not produce the expected results: 1 missile
penetrates the defense and causes 33% damage. The fraction
remaining should be 0.667, not 0.556.
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7. Case VI:
a = 8, b i = 2, b 2 = 2
EOA = 1.00
EDB = (2/8) of the effect of 8 missiles nullified =
(2/8) x 1.00 = 0.25
Fs8 = 1 - (1.00 x (1 - 0.25)) = 0.25
The model does not produce the expected results: 6
missiles penetrate the defense and cause 100% damage. The
fraction remaining should be 0.00, not 0.25.
C. DISCUSSION
The Taylor model held in the first sample case, presented
to show that it does work in some cases. The other five cases
are presented to show that it does not hold in general.
Note that overkill is completely lost in computing EOA.
Furthermore, it is necessary to invent additional variables to
do the calculations, whereas the Hughes model is self-
contained. In addition, an explicit expression of staying







Jeffrey R. Cares, LT, USN
Trial #:
Scenario: NX12 I Red (1 FF) vs Blue (2 FF's) / Turn 149
Date: I I
Losses to A: % (Blue)
Losses to B:- (Red)
SSM Engagement:
Blue: Red:
Shot At By: Shot At By:
Hit By: Hit By:
Shot Down: Shot Down:
Remarks:
Red fires on defended Blue w/ 1 salvo of 4 SSM's at 50 NM.
Ship spacing 1000 yds.
Jeffrey R. Cares, LT,USN
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APPENDIX C
COMPILATION OF RAW DATA
A. SCENARIO I
Side A (1 FF) surprises side B (1 FF) with a salvo of 4
SSM's at a range of 50NM. Data in each cell are "hits, percent
damage inflicted".
3,100 2,100 3,100 4,100 3,100
2,100 1,63 3,100 3,100 2,100
4,100 2,100 0,0 2,100 2,100
2,100 3,100 3,100 3,100 3,100
3,100 1,63 2,100 2,100 3,100
2,100 4,100 3,100 4,100 2,100
1,63 2,100 4,100 2,100 3,100
4,100 4,100 2,100 3,100 3,100
2,100 1,63 4,100 3,100 3,100
1,63 2,100 2,100 2,100 3,100
Average number of hits: 2.54
Standard deviation of hits: 0.952
Average percent damage: 94.3
Standard deviation of percent damage: 17.62
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B. SCENARIO II
Side A (1 FF) surprises side B (2 FF's) with 1 salvo of 4
SSM's at a range of 50NM. Data in each cell are "hits, percent
damage inflicted".
4,100 0,0 2,100 4,81.5 3,81.5
2,63 3,81.5 3,81.5 1,31.5 2,63
3,81.5 3,81.5 4,100 1,31.5 1,31.5
3,81.5 3,50 3,81.5 2,50 1,31.5
3,81.5 2,63 3,81.5 1,31.5 1,31.5
2,63 3,50 2,50 1,31.5 3,81.5
3,81.5 4,81.5 1,31.5 4,50 4,81.5
2,63 3,81.5 3,50 1,31.5 2,63
3,81.5 3,81.5 3,81.5 1,31.5 2,63
2,63 3,81.5 2,63 2,50 1,31.5
Average number of hits: 2.36
Standard deviation of hits: 1.0253
Average percent damage: 62.22
Standard deviation of percent damage: 23.3472
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C. SCENARIO III
Side A (1 FF) exchanges salvoes with side B (1 FF) at
50NM. Salvo size: 4 SSM's. Both defenses active. Data in each
cell are "hits, percent damage inflicted, number of missiles
shot down by opposing side's defense".
2,100,1 2,100,2 0,0,2 1,63,2 3,100,1
2,100,2 3,100,0 2,100,1 2,100,1 1,63,2
1,63,2 2,100,1 1,63,1 1,63,1 1,63,2
2,100,2 2,100,1 1,63,2 1,63,2 1,63,2
0,0,1 3,100,0 1,63,2 0,0,2 2,100,1
0,0,2 1,63,2 2,100,0 1,63,2 2,100,2
0,0,2 2,100,2 0,0,2 1,63,1 0,0,2
3,100,0 1,63,2 2,100,2 1,63,1 2,100,2
2,100,2 0,0,2 2,100,2 1,63,1 2,100,2
1,63,2 1,63,2 1,63,1 2,100,0 1,63,1
Average number of hits: 1.32
Standard deviation of hits: 0.8676
Average percent damage: 66.74
Standard deviation of percent damage: 37.15
Average number shot down by defense: 1.46
Standard deviation of number shot down by defense: 0.7068
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D. SCENARIO IV
Side A (1 FF) exchanges salvoes with side B (2 FF's) at a
range of 50NM. Salvo size per ship: 4 SSM's. All defenses
active. Data in each cell are "hits, percent damage inflicted,
number of missiles shot down by opposing side's defense".
1. Side A
0,0,3 2,50,2 0,0,4 0,0,3 1,31.5,1
1,31.5,2 1,31.5,3 0,0,2 0,0,4 0,0,3
1,31.5,2 0,0,4 1,31.5,3 1,31.5,2 0,0,0
3,81.5,1 2,50,2 1,31.5.3 2,50,2 1,31.5,3
0,0,4 1,31.5,2 1,31.5,2 1,31.5,2 0,0,4
1,31.5,3 2,50,2 3,81.5,1 1,31.5,3 2,50,2
3,81.5,0 2,63,2 1,31.5,1 0,0,4 1,31.5,2
1,31.5,3 2,63,2 1,31.5,2 0,0,4 2,50,2
1,31.5,3 1,31.5,3 0,0,4 1,31.5,3 0,0,1
1,31.5,3 1,31.5,2 0,0,4 1,31.5,2 0,0,0
Average number of hits: 0.92
Standard deviation of hits: 0.8041
Average percent damage: 27.09
Standard deviation of percent damage: 23.37
Average number shot down by defense: 2.42
Standard deviation of number shot down by defense: 1.0897
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2. Side B
3,100,1 4,100,2 5,100,1 4,100,1 4,100,2
5,100,0 2,100,2 4,100,2 3,100,2 6,100,0
4,100,1 5,100,1 4,100,1 2,100,3 4,100,0
4,100,2 2,100,4 5,100,1 4,100,2 6,100,2
3,100,1 7,100,0 3,100,2 5,100,2 4,100,0
Average number of hits: 4.08
Standard deviation of hits: 1.2557
Average percent damage: 100
Standard deviation of damage: 0.00
Average number shot down by defense: 1.40
Standard deviation of number shot down by defense: 1.00
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E. SCENARIO V
Side A (1 FF) exchanges salvoes with side B (3 FF's) at
50NM. Salvo size per ship: 4 SSM's. All defenses active. Data
in each cell are "hits, percent damage inflicted, number of
missiles shot down by opposing side's defense".
1. Side A
0,0,3 0,0,4 2,42,1 0,0,4 0,0,4
0,0,4 2,42,2 0,0,4 0,0,4 1,21,3
0,0,4 1,21,3 1,12,3 0,0,4 1,21,3
1,21,3 1,21,3 0,0,3 1,21,3 0,0,4
1,21,3 0,0,3 0,0,4 0,0,4 0,0,4
Average number of hits: 0.48
Standard deviation of hits: 0.7071
Average percent damage: 10.08
Standard deviation of percent damage: 13.7171
Average number shot down by defense: 3.32
Standard deviation of number shot down by defense: 0.7483
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2. Side B
0,0,3 4,100,2 6,100,1 5,100,1 5,100,1
5,100,2 4,100,2 2,100,3 3,100,0 6,100,1
5,100,2 8,100,2 4,100,2 9,100,2 3,100,2
4,100,1 8,100,1 7,100,1 3,100,2 5,100,0
7,100,1 6,100,3 5,100,3 5,100,1 10,100,0
Average number of hits: 5.16
Standard deviation of hits: 2.2301
Average percent damage: 96
Standard deviation of damage: 20
Average number shot down by defense: 1.44
Standard deviation of number shot down by defense: 0.9165
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F. SCENARIO VI
Side A (2 FF's) exchange salvoes with side B (3 FF's) at
50NM. Salvo size per ship: 4 SSM's. All defenses active. Data
in each cell are "hits, percent damage inflicted, number of
missiles shot down by opposing side's defense".
1. Side A
4,54.3,2 0,0,5 1,21,5 1,21,6 2,42,3
1,21,3 1,21,5 1,21,4 2,42,4 1,21,5
3,54.3,2 2,42,3 1,21,5 2,42,4 3,63,4
1,21,3 2,42,5 2,42,4 2,42,5 0,0,5
3,54.3,1 1,21,5 2,42,4 0,0,4 3,54.3,5
Average number of hits: 1.64
Standard deviation of hits: 1.036
Average percent damage: 32.21
Standard deviation of percent damage: 18.161
Average number shot down by defense: 4.04
Standard deviation of number shot down by defense: 1.2069
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2. side B
2,50,5 5,100,2 3,81.5,4 5,100,2 1,31.5,3
5,50,3 3,81.5,4 6,100,3 4,50,3 3,81.5,4
5,100,4 7,100,2 6,100,1 8,100,2 5,81.5,4
3,81.5,4 7,100,3 4,100,1 5,100,2 3,50,4
6,81.5,1 4,81.5,2 7,100,3 3,50,4 2,63,4
Average number of hits: 4.48
Standard deviation of hits: 1.806
Average percent damage: 80.6
Standard deviation of percent damage: 21.44
Average number shot down by defense: 2.96




1. Combat Energy (E)
Combat energy is a characteristic of a participant
that has some lethal value in combat.
2. Combat Entropy (AH)
Combat entropy is the gain (or loss) of combat power
due to tactical efficiencies (or inefficiencies).
3. Combat Potential (P)
Combat potential is stored combat energy.
4. Combat Power (H)
Combat power is the expenditure rate of combat energy
by one participant against another during conflict.
5. Combat Work (AS)
Combat work is the result of transforming combat
potential to effective combat power and eroding an opponent's
staying power.
6. Damage (AN)
Damage is the loss in notional ship units to a force
of N notional ships.
7. Effective Combat Power (Neff)
Effective combat power is combat energy applied to a




The missile-sump effect occurs when targets absorb
proportionally more enemy combat energy than other targets in
the target environment.
9. Mission Kill
A mission kill is a determination of how much damage
must be done to an opponent to render it useless for current
combat purposes.
10. Overkill
Overkill is the overabundance of effective offensive
combat power.
11. Scouting Effectiveness (an)
The scouting effectiveness of side N is a
dimensionless effective offensive combat power degrader of
range [0,1].
12. Salvo
A salvo is combat power which arrives at the target in
a single, instantaneous pulse.
13. Staying Power (8)
Staying power is the measure of the amount of enemy
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